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THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Robert W. Harbeson*

T

WO circumstances may be advanced by way of justification for the
present addition to the voluminous literature dealing with the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. First, the Supreme Court has in recent months
handed down two decisions involving the application of the Sherman
Act to the oil industry, which are of great importance both because of
their sweeping application to marketing practices in that industry and
because of the directness with which they raise certain issues of economic theory and policy. Second, the fiftieth anniversary of the Sherman Act on July 2, I 940 provides an appropriate occasion for a review
of the development and present status of that law in the light of these
recent decisions. We turn first to an analysis of the latter and thence to
a discussion of the fundamental legal and economic issues involved.

I
In the first of the cases referred to, the government sought to
restrain the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation from granting licenses to
jobbers, under patents controlled by it, to sell and distribute leadtreated motor fuel, and also to restrain it from enforcing provisions in
licenses to oil refiners which restricted their sale of the motor fuel to
licensed jobbers. The Ethyl Corporation owns two patents covering a
compound containing tetraethyl lead, which increases the efficiency of
internal combustion engines by permitting higher compression without
engine "knock," the degree of efficiency being represented by the
so-called "octane" rating of the gasoline. It also has a patent claiming
a motor fuel produced by mixing gasoline with the foregoing compound and another claiming a method of using the patented fluid in
combustion motors. The company receives no royalty for the licenses
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which it grants to refiners and jobbers but derives its profit solely
from the sale of the patented fluid to its refiner licensees. One-half of
the company's stock is owned by the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey and the remainder by General Motors Corporation and the
E. I. DuPont de Nemours Company.
The licenses to refiners prohibited the latter· from selling treated
gasoline to any except other licensed refiners, jobbers licensed by the
Ethyl Corporation, and retail dealers and consumers. The refiners
agreed, upon notice, to discontinue sales to other refiners and jobbers
whose licenses the Ethyl Corporation had cancelled. Important features
of the licenses were the specification of the maximum amount of the
ethyl fluid to be used in the gasoline, the maximum octane rating of the
refiners' best "regular" or non-premium gasoline, the minimum octane
rating of their ethyl gasoline, and the price differential to be maintained between the "regular" and ethyl grades. The licenses also required the refiners to use equipment and processes for mixing the ethyl
fluid with gasoline which were approved by public health authorities
and specified the conditions ur1der which the name of the Ethyl Corporation,· its trademark or trade names, could be used in connection
with advertising of the treated fuel.
Jobbers were generally required to apply for licenses through the
refiners from whom they expected to purchase the treated gasoline,
and were required to secure new licenses upon changing their source of
supply. They received the right to sell within a specified territory regular and ethyl gasoline manufactured by a designated licensed refiner.
The jobbers agreed to furnish the Ethyl Corporation monthly with a
list of the places at which the motor fuel was sold under the licenses,
to refrain from adulterating or diluting the treated fuel, to abide by
public health regulations, and to observe requirements with respect to
the use of the Ethyl Corporation's corporate and trade names similar
to those imposed on the refiners. The jobbers' licenses could be cancelled at any time for failure to comply with their terms, and either
party could cancel, with or without cause, on thirty days' written notice.
The foregoing licensing system affected the bulk of the business
of refining and distributing motor fuel in the United States. The Ethyl
Corporation licensed one hundred and twenty-three refiners, including
all the major oil companies except the Sun Oil Company. These companies refine eighty-eight per cent of all the gasoline sold in the United
States, the gasoline processed by them is seventy per cent of all the
gasoline thus sold, and eighty-five per cent of all gasoline processed to
obtain a high octane rating. Of twelve thousand jobbers doing business
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in the United States, about eleven thousand were licensed by the Ethyl
Corporation, and these handled a substantial portion of all the ethyl
gasoline sold. The greater part of the latter product moves in interstate
commerce.
The lower court held that "it was perhaps a permissible, though
not a necessary conclusion that an agreement or understanding for the
maintenance of prices existed between the appellant and the jobber
licensees." 1 That court found it unnecessary to pass upon this question,
however,
"since it found that the appellant's licensing practices affecting the
jobbers, in conjunction with the agreements and cooperation of the
licensed refiners, had been used by appellant as the means of
excluding from the market the unlicensed jobbers who do not conform to the market policies and posted gasoline prices adopted
by the major oil companies or the market leaders among them,
and that appellant uses the control thus established to coerce adherence to those policies and prices generally by the licensed
jobbers, and that this restriction upon the industry effected through
the license contracts with refiners and jobbers was not within
appellant's patent monopoly, and operated unreasonably to restrain interstate commerce in the processed gasoline." 2
On the basis of these findings, the lower court invalidated the jobbers'
licenses and the provision in the refiners' business restricting sale of the
treated gasoline to licensed jobbers. It also held that the licensing
system was unnecessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of
the patentee in maintaining the quality of the treated gasoline and its
use by jobbers with safety to public health.
On the other hand, the appellant Ethyl Corporation denied that
it used the jobbers' licensing system to maintain prices and advanced
two defenses of the system: It contended, first, that the restrictions
imposed through the refiners' and jobbers' licenses were "all reasonably
necessary for the commercial development of appellant's patents and
for insuring a financial return from them, and are therefore within its
patent monopoly." 3 Second, it urged that the conditions attached to
the refiners' and jobbers' licenses were necessary for the maintenance
of the quality of the treated gasoline and for the protection of the
public in its use of a product containing a dangerous poison.
1

Quoted in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436 at 450, 60
S. Ct. 618 (1940).
2
Id., 309 U.S. at 450-451.
3
Id., 309 U.S. at 451.
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In Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v. United States,4 decided March
25, 1940, the Supreme Court sustained the lower court's decree. Justice
Stone wrote the opinion for a unanimous court, Justices McReynolds
and Roberts taking no part. The Court held that while the Ethyl Corporation under its patent rights could lawfully exclude any number of
jobbers from participation in the national market for lead-treated gasoline, the Sherman Act prohibited, and the patent law did not sanction,
use of that power in such a way as to regulate prices and suppress competition, among the purchasers of the patented articles. The Court
found that the appellant corporation's licensing system gave it power
to accomplish those objectives, and that "the record supports the finding of the trial court that appellant has exercised that power continuously for a considerable period as a means of control over the price
policies of the licensed jobbers." 5
By way of explanation of the latter statement, Justice Stone pointed
out that according to the stipulation of facts in the case the Ethyl
Corporation since I 929 had investigated through field agents the "business ethics" of jobbers applying for licenses and had rejected such applications upon the adverse report of the agent; that the corporation
admitted that the phrase "business ethics" denoted compliance with the
marketing policies and prevailing prices determined by the major oil
companies, among which was the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, which owned half of the corporation's stock; and that
''While not all applicants who have failed to maintain prices and
marketing policies have been rejected, the record leaves no doubt
that the appellant has made use of its dominant position in the
trade to exercise control over prices and marketing policies of
jobbers ·in a sufficient number of cases and with sufficient continuity to make its attitude toward price cutting a pervasive influence in the jobbing trade. . . . Large numbers of refiners and
the majority of jobbers believe that the jobbers must maintain
the required business ethics in order to obtain licenses, and a number of licensed jobbers believe that they are required by appellant's licensing practices to maintain prices and abide by the
marketing practices ·of the major oil companies." 6

It is significant that the Ethyl Corporation kept no record of the
ground of rejection of applications for licenses "admittedly because it
is reluctant to preserve in its records 'the extent to which maintenance
'309 U. S. 436, 60 S. Ct. 618 (1940).
6
Id., 309 U.S. at 453.
6
Id., 309 U.S. at 453, 454.

1940]

THE SHERMAN

AcT

TonAY

1 93

of prices and marketing policies by jobbers entered into the granting of
licenses.'" 1 Thus price competition among jobbers was effectively suppressed without resort to contracts or agreements prescribing resale
prices by jobbers, which would clearly have exposed the Ethyl Corporation to anti-trust prosecution.
While the Court had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that
the licensing system violated the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, there
remained the question whether the arrangements could be validated,
as the appellant contended, under the patent law. Justice Stone, in
reviewing the leading cases, called attention to the fundamental principle that a patentee may grant licenses to make, use, or vend his
product, subject to any restrictions which he wished to impose, save
only those restrictions which would enlarge his monopoly beyond that
conferred by the patent. Applying this principle to the case in hand it
was held that
"by the authorized sales of the [treated] fuel by refiners to jobbers the patent monopoly over it is exhausted, and after the sale
neither appellant nor the refiners may longer rely on the patents
to exercise any control over the price at which the fuel may be
resold." 8
The Ethyl Corporation neither owned nor sold the treated fuel,
nor derived any royalties from its sale. Hence whatever benefits resulted from control over the marketing policies of the jobbers accrued
primarily to the refiners and only indirectly to the appellant corporation in the enjoyment of its monopoly over the manufacture of the
patented fluid. Thus the licensing conditions were used not to stimulate
the commercial development and financial returns of the patent on the
tetraethyl lead compound but to develop the business of the refiners
and to exploit a second patent monopoly-that on the sale of the
treated fuel-not embraced in the first. This was clearly illegal. The
situation was distinguished from the case of a patentee exercising his
right to refuse to sell, or to permit his licensee to sell, his patented
product to price cutters. Here the licenses and patents had been used
as a means of suppressing competition among jobbers and of controlling
prices charged by them. The final conclusion of the Court was summed
up as follows:
"Agreements for price maintenance of articles moving in interstate
commerce are, without more, unreasonable restraints within the
7
8

Id., 309 U. S. at 454.
Id., 309 U.S. at 457.
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meaning of the Sherman Act because they eliminate competition
••. and agreements which create potential power for such price
maintenance exhibited by its actual exertion for that purpose are
in themselves unlawful restraints within the meaning of the
Sherman Act, which is not only a prohibition against the infliction
of a particular type of public injury but 'a limitation of rights
which may be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained.'" 9

II
The second decision with which we are concerned in this paper is
of even wider importance and is commonly known as the "Madison
Oil Case," inasmuch as it was tried in the federal district court in
Madison, Wisconsin. 10 The government charged twenty-seven oil companies and fifty-six individuals, eventually reduced to twelve companies
and five individuals, with conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce
in gasoline in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The indictment
was returned in December, 1936, and charged that the defendants
"'combined and conspired together for the purpose of artificially raising
and fixing the tank car prices of gasoline in the "spot markets" in the
East Texas and Mid-Continent fields;' " 11 that they maintained gasoline prices at high and non-competitive levels agreed upon among
themselves; and that since the prices charged to jobbers were made to
depend on the spot market prices the foregoing action raised both the
wholesale and retail prices of gasoline in the Mid-Western area. It was
charged that the defendants e:ffectuated the foregoing conspiracy by
engaging in two concerted gasoline buying programs in the East Texas
and Mid-Continent fields between February, 1935, and December,
1936. In the East Texas buying program, the East Texas Refiners'
Marketing Association, formed in February, 1935, for the purpose of
facilitating the sale of the gasoline to the defendant major oil companies, allocated orders for gasoline received from the defendants
among the members of the association. In the Mid-Continent buying
program, purchases were made by the defendants from independent
refiners according to an agreed allotment, a committee representing the
defendants assigning each of the latter to one or more independents
for the purchase of the alloted quantity of gasoline. In this way there
was purchased over half of the gasoline sold by the independents, an
9

Id., 309 U. S. at 458, citing cases.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 811 (1940).
11 Quoted, id., 310 U. S. at 166.
10
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amount greater than the defendants would otherwise have purchased,
while at the same time, at the instance of certain of the defendants, the
independents curtailed their production of gasoline.
The background of the alleged conspiracy was the vast increase in
production of crude oil and the extreme fluctuations in the price of both
crude oil and gasoline during the decade ending in 1935. The great
quantity of crude oil produced, beginning about 1926, caused a sharp
drop in the price of both crude oil and gasoline, resulted in great waste
of oil, and reduced the productive capacity of the oil fields. Oklahoma,
Kansas and Texas attempted to deal with this problem by enacting
proration laws, but in 1930 the great East Texas field was discovered,
the supply of oil from which was so great as to drive prices of crude oil
down to ten or fifteen cents a barrel and gasoline as low as two and
one-eighth cents a gallon. The proration laws, especially that of Texas,
were widely violated, the oil unlawfully produced being called "hot
oil" and the gasoline manufactured therefrom "hot gasoline." Hot oil
sold for substantially less than the legally produced oil, and hence the
gasoline produced from it could be manufactured and sold for less than
the cost of legally produced gasoline. It was said that independent refiners using legal crude were placed in an extremely difficult position,
in that they were compelled to continue operations even though on an
unprofitable basis in order to avoid losing their oil connections in the
field and their regular customers. Since in general they had little
storage capacity, they were compelled to sell the gasoline as they made
it. Such gasoline came to be known as "distress gasoline," which the
refiner could not store, for which he had no regular sales outlets, and
which, therefore, had to be dumped on the market for whatever price
it would bring.
During the first half of 1933 the market was flooded with "distress
gasoline." In June of that year the National Industrial Recovery Act
was passed, which authorized the President (in section 9c) to forbid
the interstate or foreign shipment of petroleum produced or withdrawn from storage in violation of state laws. An Executive Order of
the President on July 11, 1933 forbade such shipments, and on August
19, 1933 a code of fair competition for the petroleum industry was
approved. Thereafter voluntary efforts of the industry, which, the
defendants claimed, were nevertheless in accordance with the desire
and approval of the Administrator of the Petroleum Code, succeeded
in achieving partial and temporary stabilization of oil and gasoline
prices. It was recognized, however, that little could be accomplished
along this line until the continuing flow of hot oil and gasoline was
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stopped. Therefore, the administrator, in October, 1934, set up a
Federal Tender Board and issued an order making it illegal to ship
crude oil or gasoline out of East Texas in interstate or foreign commerce unless accompanied by a tender issued by the board certifying
that it had been legally produced or manufactured. The flow of hot
oil and gasoline was checked and prices rose sharply, but the improvement was only temporary. The enforcement of the order was enjoined,
and on January 7, 1935, the Supreme Court in Panama Refining Co.
·-v. Ryan 12 held unconstitutional section 9c of the N.I.R.A., upon which
the order was based. Following that decision, the problem of hot oil
and gasoline once more became acute, and in order to deal with this
situation, the Connally Act was passed and became effective February
13
22, 1935. This measure prohibited the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of illegally produced oil and gasoline, replacing the
arrangements which had been invalidated by the Panama Refining case.
On the following March 7 the buying program which was alleged to
constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade was begun.
The defendants claimed immunity from prosecution under the
Sherman Act on the ground that the buying programs constituted no
more than a reasonable restraint of trade, since they were directed
toward remedying a disorganized condition in the gasoline market, and
that in any case the purchases had only a minor effect on gasoline
prices. The rise in the latter was said to be caused primarily by such
factors as the control of crude oil production, the operation of the Connally Act, and the increase in demand accompanying business revival.
The defendants also relied upon the fact that during the N. I. R. A.
period the purchases were made with the knowledge and tacit approval
of the Petroleum Administrative Board, an advisory body established
by the Administrator of the Petroleum Code.
The district court charged the jury that "where the members of a
combination had the power to raise prices and acted together for that
purpose, the combination was illegal," and that the foregoing defenses
were irrelevant.14 The defendants were convicted. The circuit court
of appeals reversed the trial court because "In its view respondents'
activities were not unlawful unless they constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade." 15 The case was remanded for a new trial in order
12

293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
49 Stat. L. 30 (1935).
14 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
(1940).
15
Id., 310 U. S. at ZII.
13

8II

310

U. S. 150 at

210,

60 S. Ct.
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that the character of these activities and their effect on competition
could be determined and the issue of their reasonableness submitted
to the jury. Upon appeal the Supreme Court in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc.,1 6 decided May 6, 1940, reversed
the circuit court of appeals and upheld the trial court. Justice Douglas
wrote the opinion for a majority of five, Chief Justice Hughes and
Justice Murphy taking no part, while Justices Roberts and McReynolds dissented. The appeal involved, in addition to the question of
the applicability of the Sherman Act, certain procedural questions with
which we are not concerned in this paper.
Justice Douglas stated by way of introduction that the alleged conspiracy was not to be found in any formal contract or agreement but
had to be developed from the extensive record in the case. The main
issue before the Court was whether the reasonableness of the restraints
imposed by the buying programs conferred immunity from prosecution
under the Sherman Act. On this point, Justice Douglas reviewed the
decisions from United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn. 11 to the
Ethyl Gasoline case, discussed above, and concluded that
"for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of
so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were
designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense." 18
The main reliance for this holding was United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co.,19 in which a combination controlling eighty-two per cent
of the business of manufacturing and distributing vitreous pottery was
convicted on account of an agreement to fix prices, and where the Court
refused to recognize the contention that an agreement to fix prices was
not illegal unless it unreasonably restrained interstate commerce. The
defendants sought to distinguish the Trenton Potteries case from the
one in question by pointing out that there the parties substituted an
agreed-upon price for one determined by competition, that they had
both the power and the purpose to suppress competition, and hence that
the controlling factor in that decision was the destruction of competition
rather than the reasonableness of the prices fixed. By contrast they
claimed that in the present case there was no elimination of competition
310 u. s. 150, 60 s. Ct. 8II (1940).
166 U.S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540 (1897).
18
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 at 218, 60 S. Ct.
8II (1940).
19
273 U. S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377 (1927).
18

17
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in the spot tank car market, that they had tried to do no more than free
competition from the effect of distress gasoline and that they had
neither the power nor the purpose to set an arbitrary, non-competitive
price. To this the Court replied that there was abundant evidence that
the purpose of the buying programs was to raise prices and that they
had at least contributed to the rise in, and stabilization of, gasoline
prices in the Mid-Western area, which was sufficient proof of the existence of a conspiracy within the meaning of section I of the Sherman
Act. The fact that the spot markets were still governed by some competition was held to be of no consequence, the Court saying:
"The whole scheme was carefully planned and executed to the
end that distress gasoline would not overhang the markets and
depress them at any time. And as a result of the payment of fair
going market prices a floor was placed and kept under the spot
markets. Prices rose and jobbers and consumers in the MidWestern area paid more for their gasoline than they would have
paid but for the conspiracy. Competition was not eliminated from
the markets; but it was clearly curtailed, since restriction of the
supply of gasoline, the timing and placement of the purchases
under the buying programs and the placing· of a floor under the
spot markets obviously reduced the play of the forces of supply
and demand." 20
In an extensive footnote, Justice Douglas distinguished between
restraint of trade under section I of the Sherman Act and conspiracy
to monopolize under section 2. He pointed out that "a conspiracy to
fix prices violates § I of the Act though no overt act is shown, though
it is not established that the conspirators had the means available for
the accomplishment of their objective, and though the conspiracy
embraced but a part of the interstate or foreign commerce in the commodity." 21 Only where the offense charged is conspiracy to monopolize under section 2 is it necessary to prove intent and power to accomplish the desired objective.
In support of the contention that their activities constituted no more
than a reasonable restraint of trade and that only unreasonable restraints violated the Sherman Act, the respondents cited a series of
decisions, including the Standard Oil, 22 American Tobacco, 28 Chicago
20

United States v. Socony:-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 at 220, 60 S. Ct.
811 (1940).
21
Id., 3 IO U. S. at 225, note 59.
22
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct.
502 (1911).
23
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632 (1911),
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Board of Trade, 24 Maple Flooring, 25 Cement,26 Appalachian Coals 21
and Sugar Institute 28 cases. The Court dismissed the contention that
the rule of reason announced in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions applied to the present case with the brief comment that
it had "no application to combinations operating directly on prices or
price structures." 20 Main reliance was placed by the respondents on the
Appalachian Coals case. There certain producers of bituminous coal had
formed an exclusive selling agency, one of the principal functions of
which was to obtain the best possible price for the coal produced by its
principals, and, if all the coal could not be sold, to apportion orders
upon a stated basis. With certain exceptions it was to determine the
prices at which sales would be made without consultation with its principals. Other functions of the agency were the establishment of a standard classification of coal, the promotion of the use of bituminous coal
by advertising and by maintaining an engineering department to demonstrate the advantages of this fuel, and the operation of a credit department to determine the reliability of purchasers. The agency was
formed during the depth of depression in 1932 tp deal with a demoralized coal market, especially the problem of "distress coal," defined as
coal shipped to m~rket which was unsold at the time of delivery and
which had therefore to be dumped on the market for whatever price it
would bring.
The Court conceded that the element which the Appalachian Coals
case and the case at bar had in common was "the presence in each of
so-called demoralizing or injurious practices," 80 illustrated by the
similar problems of "distress coal" and "distress gasoline," but contended that the methods used in dealing with them were so divergent
as to make the difference between legality and illegality. In the instant
case there was a well organized buying program having as its "direct
purpose and aim the raising and maintenance of spot market prices and
of prices to jobbers and consumers in the Mid-Western area, by the
2¼ Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S. Ct.
242 (1918).
25
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 S. Ct. 578,
592 (1925).
26
Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 45 S. Ct. 586,
592 (1925).
27
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933).
28
Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629 ( 1936).
29
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 at 214, 60 S. Ct. 8II
(1940).
•
so Id., 310 U.S. at 216.
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elimination of distress gasoline as a market factor." 31 By contrast, the
Court thought that the main purpose of the selling agency in the
Appalachian Coals case was improvement in marketing processes of the
coal industry, through the collection, dissemination and utilization of
all relevant information, and that whatever effects the establishment
of the agency might have on prices were wholly incidental. In any
case the effect of the agency on prices was conjectural, since the plan
had not been put into operation at the time of the decision, and the
district court had been directed to institute further proceedings if the
operation of the agency proved to be an undue restraint on interstate
commerce. It was stated that the agency had neither the purpose nor
the power to fix the price of coal in the consuming markets, and that the
coal which it sold would be subject to the active competition of that sold
by other producers.
The fact that the buying programs were conducted with the knowledge and acquiescence of federal officials afforded no defense, according to Justice Douglas, since admittedly no specific approval of the
buying programs had been obtained under the N. I. R. A., and only
such approval would give immunity from prosecution under the Sherman Act. Furthermore, even if such approval had been obtained, it
would not have survived the expiration of the act on June 16, 1935.
In a significant passage, he indicated that "the typical method adopted
by Congress when it has lifted the ban of the Sherman Act is the
scrutiny and approval of designated public representatives." 82 By way
of illustration, he mentioned the adoption of the NRA codes with the
approval of the President, the exemption from anti-trust prosecution
of railway consolidations pursuant to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Maloney Act, providing for associations of
brokers and dealers with the approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the price control provisions of the Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937 administered by the Bituminous Coal Commission.
The views of Justice Roberts, dissenting, are best indicated by the
following excerpts from his opinion:
"There was substantial evidence that all the defendants agreed
to, or did, was to act in concert to eliminate distress gasoline;
that such gasoline was a competitive evil in that it tended to impair or destroy normal competition. There was substantial evidence that what they agreed to, and did, neither fixed nor controlled prices nor unreasonably affected normal competition and
31
82

Id.,
Id.,

310 U.S. at 216.
310 U.S. at 227, note 601.
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that their conduct affected prices only in the sense that the
purchase of distress gasoline at going prices permitted prices
to rise to a normal competitive level. There was no evidence
that, as charged in the indictment, they agreed to, or in fact did,
fix prices. The Court of Appeals, as I think, correctly held 'that
the substance of what was accomplished and agreed on was that the
major companies would purchase from the independent refiners
the latter's surplus gasoline at going market prices.' ...
"One of these firmly established principles [ of earlier c!ecisions] is that concerted action to remove a harmful and destructive
practice in an industry, even though such removal have the effect
of raising the price level, is not offensive to the Sherman Act if
it is not intended and does not operate unreasonably to restrain
interstate commerce; and such action has been held not unreasonably to restrain commerce if, as here, it involves no agreement
for uniform prices but leaves the defendants free to compete with
each other in the matter of price. . ..
"I think Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States ..• a controlling authority sustaining the defendants' contention that the
charge foreclosed a defense available to them under the Sherman
Act. It is said that their combination had the purpose and effect
of putting a floor under the spot market for gasoline. But that
was precisely the purpose and effect of the plan in the Appalachian
case. True, the means adopted to overcome the effect of the
dumping of distress products on the market were not the same in
the two cases, but means are unimportant provided purpose and
effect are lawful." ss

III

In order to evaluate the foregoing decisions it is necessary to understand thoroughly the difference between the economic and legal
meanings of monopoly. In economics the term monopoly means control of the market; that is, the ability of a seller, by increasing or
decreasing his output, to affect the price of the product sold. Until
recent years monopoly was regarded as the antithesis of competition;
the two were conceived to be qualitatively distinct. 34 Moreover, the
price system in general was regarded as conforming to this theoretical
division; there was either competition or monopoly. The unrealistic
character of this view of the economic organization is clearly brought
out by an examination of the requisites of pure monopoly and pure
ss Id., 310 U.S. at 260, 261, 261-262.
34
An exception is the writings of the early mathematical economists on duopoly.
For the modern theory, see E. H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLISTIC
CoMPETITioN, 3d ed. (1938).
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competlt10n respectively.s 5 Strictly speaking, pure monopoly would
involve control over the supply of all economic goods whatsoever by
the same firm or agency. Competition of substitutes is thus excluded
by definition. Obviously, monopoly in this sense does not exist. In
practice pure monopoly is taken to mean exclusive control over the
supply of a commodity for which there are no close substitutes. Even in
this sense of the term the number of examples of pure monopoly outside
the public utility field is small. At the opposite extreme, for pure competition to prevail, no buyer or seller, acting independently, could influence the price of the article sold. :Very few examples of this type of
market exist, the closest approximation being in staple crop agriculture.
Clearly the vast majority of all prices are determined under conditions intermediate between the foregoing extremes; that is, they
reflect the joint operation of monopolistic and competitive influences,
both of which are present in varying degrees in each case. There is a
continuous gradation in degrees of market control intermediate between
the extremes of pure monopoly and pure competition. This situation
is described in modern economic theory by the terms oligopoly and
monopolistic competition. Oligopoly refers to a situation in which the
sellers of a given commodity are sufficiently few in number that "it is
necessary for each one to take into account the effect that his own actions
may have on the behavior of his rivals, and to act accordingly." sB A
condition of monopolistic competition exists "when there are many
producers of a certain type of product, and when, at the same time, the
substitution of the product of one firm for that of another is limited
by product differentiation." 37 Frequently oligopoly and monopolistic
competition are combined in a given case, but either one separately is
sufficient to introduce monopolistic influences. In any event, price competition is disadvantageous from the standpoint of the individual firm
and there is both opportunity and a strong incentive to turn competition
into non-price channels.
The omnipresence of oligopoly and monopolistic competition, separately or in combination, introduces into the price system some elements which are desirable and others which are undesirable from the
broadest public point of view. On the one hand, it may be pointed out,
first, that in many industries the attainment of producing units of the
35 In the following description of the economic meaning of monopoly the writer
has drawn upon his paper, "The Public Interest Concept in Law and Economics,"
37 M1cH. L. REV. 181-208 (1938).
SB A. M. McISAAc and J. G. SMITH, INTRODUCTION TO EcoNoM1c ANALYSIS 48
(1937).
87Jd., 47.
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most advantageous size would be impossible if the number of firms
were large enough to permit pure competition to prevail. Second, it may
be argued that, within limits, advertising expenditure and product
differentiation increase the satisfaction of wants above what it would
be under the standardization required for pure competition.
On the other hand, there is, first and obviously, the existence of
monopoly profits scattered throughout the economic organization, as
well as the facilitation of monopolistic agreements as the number of
competitors declines. Second, under certain circumstances there is persistent overinvestment and excess capacity as a result of the failure of
price competition to function. Costs and prices under such conditions
would be above the competitive level although profits might not be in
excess of a competitive rate. Third, product differentiation in many
cases has been carried beyond the point which would prevail if consumers acted rationally and with full knowledge, with a resultant adverse effect on the national income. Fourth, monopoly elements permit
price discrimination wherever markets can be separated. Finally, under
oligopoly and monopolistic competition firms are able to define and
pursue a policy with respect to such matters as price, investment, output
and marketing arrangements. In many cases adverse results follow, as,
for example, where the policy is to maintain rigid prices, which are
recognized as aggravating business fluctuations.
Two implications of the foregoing analysis stand out. First, the
protection of the public interest in matters of prices, costs and profits
requires some type of supervision and control over virtually the entire
price system. Second, the market relations characteristic of pure competition cannot in every case be used as a norm for such controls as may
be set up over the existing system. It has been pointed out that, in
certain respects and subject to appropriate controls, some elements of
monopoly may be advantageous.
By contrast, as Professor Mason has pointed out, "The term
monopoly as used in the law is not a tool of analysis but a standard of
evaluation," by means of which public policy with respect to certain
business practices might be developed. 88 Partly because of the difficulty
of using monopoly in the sense of control of the market as a standard
of evaluation and partly for other reasons, monopoly has come to mean
in the law the suppression of the freedom of an individual or firm to
compete, by legal restraint, by agreements among competitors or by
88
Mason, "Monopoly in Law and Economics," 47 YALE L. J. 34-49 (1937).
The following discussion of the legal meaning of monopoly owes much to Professor

Mason's excellent article.
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predatory tactics of rivals. _While the dicta of the courts contain frequent
reference to control of the market as indicative of monopoly, the evidence bearing on such control is almost entirely neglected in reaching
the actual decisions. There is evidence that the courts in adopting this
definition of monopoly were giving effect to the legislative understanding of the monopoly problem and to the intent of the Sherman Act.
An examination of the debates on the latter measure indicates that the
chief concern of Congress was to deal with industrial combinations
which had secured a commanding position through predatory tactics,
such as local price discrimination and the securing of railway rebates.
There are several reasons for the adoption by the law of the foregoing definition of monopoly. 39 In the first place, in the earliest development of the law in the Elizabethan period in England monopoly
came to be identified with an exclusive grant by the crown to individuals for the conduct of particular businesses, and the idea of exclusion, in the broad sense of restriction of competition, has been retained
in the development of the law. Second, and probably of the greatest
importance, it was necessary for the courts to have available tests capable of distinguishing between situations which were and were not in
the public interest. If the economic definition of monopoly as control
of the market were adopted and used as a standard of evaluation, there
would be involved .a complicated analysis of such factors as the behavior of prices and outputs, the relation of prices and costs, the share
of the market controlled, the existence of such practices as price discrimination, and many others-a task which the courts would obviously be ill-equipped to undertake. By contrast, if monopoly were
taken to mean restriction of competition, the tests of conformity to
public interest would be comparatively simple. A third reason is that
in an earlier· period it is quite possible that restriction of competition
through predatory tactics was more likely to be the means of securing
control of the market than at present. Finally, before the Sherman Act
most monopoly actions were brought by private interests, which were
more likely to feel direct adverse effects from predatory tactics than
from control of the market. Furthermore, injuries of this sort to
private interests were more obvious than injuries to buyers or sellers
by market control attained without such practices.
From the economic standpoint the legal conception of monopoly
-appears grossly inadequate. A very high degree of monopoly control,
in the economic sense, would be possible without involving anything
39

Id., 45-46.
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which the courts would call monopoly. In the first place, where a
condition of oligopoly, as defined above, obtains, each seller must keep
in mind that any change in his price will almost certainly be met by
similar changes on the part of his rivals. Consequently, price changes
tend to be infrequent, and a result similar to that which would have
been reached by outright agreement is obtained, without collusion and
without involving restraint of trade in the legal sense. Second, the
amount of capital resources necessary to enter such industries as steel,
automobiles and the like greatly hampers the entry of new firms and
permits control of the market by those now in the field without resort
to predatory tactics against potential competitors. Again, the use of
trade marks and trade names to differentiate the product of the individual seller gives the latter some control over price, the degree of
control depending upon his success, through intensive advertising, in
differentiating his product in the minds of buyers. The economist refers
to this as a condition of monopolistic competition, but the courts are
unable to see any monopolistic element present, since there is no restriction of competition in the legal sense. 40 It should be remarked in
passing that the existence of monopolistic elements as a result of
product differentiation is not regarded by the economist as necessarily
or in every instance contrary to the public interest.
The foregoing comments serve to explain the rationale of the decisions in which the Supreme Court has permitted huge enterprises
exercising important monopolistic influence to stand, as in the United
States Steel 41 and International Harvester 42 cases, while on a number
of occasions it has invalidated trade association and other collective
activities imposing much weaker restraints on competition on the ground
that they violated the prohibition on restraint of trade. 48 Since mergers
may take place for reasons other than the restriction of competition, the
courts could not assume that all mergers were prima facie evidence of
an attempt to monopolize. In view of the legal definition of monopoly,
intent to monopolize would in such cases be indicated almost solely
40

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1915)
227 F. 46.
n United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S. Ct. 293 (1920).
42 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 698, 47 S. Ct. 748
(1927).
n American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 S. Ct.
114 (1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43 S. Ct.
607 (1923); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377
(1927); Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629 (1936);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 811 (1940).
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by predatory tactics against present or potential competitors. On the
other hand, under the same definition of monopoly, all contracts between competitors to limit competition would prima facie constitute
restraint of trade.
·
Hence the rule of reason has for the most part been limited to
distinguishing between mergers which are and those which are not
guilty of predatory tactics. It has had a very restricted application in
the case of agreements made. by loose confederations of competitors.
There have been only six cases in which this doctrine, or its equivalent,
has been invoked to sanction agreements among competitors, namely
the Maple Flooring,4 4 Cement,45 Chicago Board of Trade,4 6 Window
Glass,47 "Cracking'' Patents 48 and Appalachian Coals 49 cases. The application of the rule of reason in these decisions has been grounded
primarily on the theory that the agreements involved were designed
to regulate competitive methods rather than to regulate competition
in the market. An example of this sort is the validation of the dissemination of information through trade associations, provided it is made
available to all competitors and to customers and involves no coercive
measures. This doctrine harmonizes with the legal conception of monopoly, since it favors arrangements which presumably facilitate rather
than restrict freedom to compete. Howeyer, the regulation of competitive methods almost inevitably involves some degree of control of the
market, and varying degrees of such control were ignored by the Court
in the cases in which this doctrine was applied.50
44
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 S. Ct. 578,
592 (1925).
45
Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 S. Ct.
586, 592 (1925).
46
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S. Ct.
242 (1918).
47
National Assn. of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U. S. 403, 44
S. Ct. 148 (1923).
48
Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421
(1931).
49
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933).
50 See L. S. LYON and V. ABRAMSON, THE EcoNOMICS oF OPEN PRICE SYSTEMS
(1936). The following comment is very pertim,nt: "The enthusiasm with which a
number of trade associations collect statistics, and the amounts of money members are
willing to pay for them, are easily intelligible in terms of the theoretical conclusion that
detailed knowledge of future trends makes monopolistic competition more effectively
monopolistic and less competitive. This view of the economic function of statistics in
trade association behavior is confirmed by observation of :the place which informational
services occupy in trade association activity. Where the trade consists of a few sellers,
all relatively large in size, the informational services of the trade association are
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In the Appalachian Coals case the Court while basing its approval
of the arrangements involved on the theory that they were designed
to improve the processes of producing and distributing coal, with only
minor and incidental effects on the coal market, nevertheless seemingly opened the way for approval of activities bearing directly on
price provided they did not interfere with the maintenance of effective
competition. 51 The Supreme Court accepted the distinction made by the
lower court between concerted activity which merely "affected" prices
and that which ".fixed" them (in reality, varying degrees of monopolistic influence) and emphasized the absence of either power or intent
on the part of the defendants to .fix prices, and the pervasive competition which would continue to exist in the coal industry. In this connection it made the following significant comments:
"A cooperative enterprise--which carries with it no monopolistic menace, is not to be condemned as an undue restraint merely
because it may affect a change in market conditions, where the
change would be in mitigation of recognized evils and would not
impair, but rather foster, fair competitive opportunities. . . .
"If the mere size of a single embracing entity is not enough
to bring a combination in corporate form within the statutory
inhibition, the mere number and extent of the production of those
engaged in a cooperative endeavor to remedy evils which may
exist in an industry, and to improve competitive conditions, should
not be regarded as producing illegality." 52
These remarks led to the expectation that the rule of reason would
be given a broader application in cases involving loose confederations
of competitors. The .first statement quoted also indicated some possibility that the Court might adopt the economic tests in determining
what constitutes an unreasonable control of the market, while the second
revealed that the Court had not abandoned the traditional legal conefficient and well developed. But where the trade is scattered and the producing units
small, the statistical services decline in importance, and less interest in them is manifested by members. Where practical conditions preclude effective restraints one seldom
finds a highly developed statistical service." Fly, "Observations on the Anti-Trust
Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions," 45 YALE L. J. 1339 at

1345 (1936).
51 This is what Professor Handler calls the "concentric circle theory''; that is,
the area of activity subjected to control is completely surrounded by a larger area of
effective competition, so that in the Court's view there is no restraint of trade. See
Handler, "The Sugar Institute Case and the Present Status of the Anti-trust Laws,"

36 CoL. L. REV. 1 (1936).
52

Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 at 373-374, 376-

377, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933).
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ception of monopoly. Three years later, however, in the Sugar Institute cases,53 the Court, while reiterating approval of the interchange of
information per se, invalidated many of the activities of the Institute
because of .the coercive tactics employed against members and customers. ·This decision, taken in conjunction with the Socony-Vacuum
case, seems to indicate that, for the present at least, the Court intends
to hold to the traditional legal definition of monopoly and to restrict
very narrowly the application of the rule of reason in cases involving
agreements among competitors.
We are now in a position to evaluate the decisions with which this
paper is concerned. There will probably be general approval of the
Court's action in the Ethyl Gasoline case in preventing the use of
patents to fortify monopolistic influences in the gasoline market derived
from the concentration of refining and marketing facilities in the hands
of some twenty major companies. This case and the recent decision in
Interstate Circuit v. United States,5 4 involving motion-picture copyrights, represent a commendable effort on the part of the Court to prevent the unwarranted extension of patent and copyright monopolies to
types of conduct or lines of business not embraced within the proper
scope of such monopolies. There is wide support for the view, however,
that the Court is both unwilling and unable to provide the necessary
amount of protection from abuse of the patent law, and that the problem calls for revision of both the patent law and the Sherman Act. 55
The Socony-Vacuum case illustrates some of the complexities which
must be faced in developing legal controls in harmony with the requirements of a satisfactorily functioning economic order. With one possible
qualification, the writer regards the decision as both legally and economically sound. On the legal side the refusa) of the Court to sanction
the concerted action of competitors involved in the buying program is
strictly logical in view of the legal conception of monopoly as restriction
of freedom to compete and is supported by the great preponderance of
precedent. In rejecting the Appalachian Coals case as a precedent, the
Court may have been influenced by the fact that the effect on prices of
the plan there involved was conjectural, since it had not been put in
operation. It may also have taken into account-and properly-the fact
53

Sugar-Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629 (1936).
306 U. S. 208, 59 S. Ct. 467 (1939).
55 See Feuer, "The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws," 38 CoL. L. REV.
1145 (1938); Kahn, "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law," 30
AM. EcoN. REv. 475 (1940); L. S. LYoN, M. W. WATKINS and V. ABRAMSON, GovERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE, C. 6 (1939); HEARINGS BEFORE THE TEMPORARY
-NATIONAL EcoNOMIC COMMITTEE, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939), Part 3.
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that the sellers involved were a small minority of the total number
and were confronted by powerful buyers, while in the Socony-Vacuum
case the buying program was conducted by firms having a dominant
position in the industry.
On the economic side the writer feels that, with one possible qualification, the decision was likewise sound. The price cutting, which the
condemned activities sought to check, reflected the existence of both
monopolistic and non-monopolistic imperfections and of excess capacity
in the crude oil and gasoline markets. The plea that business men under
these circumstances should be permitted to stabilize prices and to take
steps to overcome price cutting cannot be countenanced, since it amounts
to asking consumers not only to sanction monopolistic price-making but
also to make good the losses attributable to excess capacity which the
producers would otherwise have to bear by reason of their errors of
judgment. This conclusion as applied to the petroleum industry is
subject to the possible qualification that there may be some connection
between stabilization of the price of gasoline and conservation of the
crude oil supply. The connection lies in the fact that the fall of gasoline prices, if sufficiently drastic and prolonged, might eliminate a
number of the weaker independent refiners or force them to shut down.
This would greatly reduce the purchases of crude and would necessitate
capping numerous high-cost wells, which in turn, through resulting
subsurface changes, would permanently reduce the amount of recoverable oil or at least greatly increase the cost of its recovery. The
validity and importance of this argument is difficult to assess, and full
consideration of it would lead into the involved and hotly disputed
question of the merits of proration laws. Some expert opinion minimizes
the loss of oil through capping of wells,56 though it is not denied that
the ultimate cost of recovering the oil may thereby be increased. Furthermore, how greatly a drastic and prolonged drop in gasoline prices
would reduce the output of crude depends on the elasticity of demand
for gasoline, a question on which exact information is as yet meager.
In view of the uncertain validity of the conservation argument,
the writer feels that the Court was on sound ground economically in
refusing to sanction the concerted activity involved in the SoconyVacuum case. He is also of the opinion that the general principle followed by the Court of restricting narrowly its approval of agreements
among competitors is in the public interest until criteria are developed
68
Joseph E. Pogue, "Economics of Conservation and Proration in the Petroleum
Industry," HEARINGS BEFORE THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL EcoNOMIC CoMMITTEE,
76th Cong., 2d sess. (1939), Part 14, p. 7435 at 7442.
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for determining what types of market organization and business practices with regard to price and otherwise are socially desirable, and
until provision is made for some kind of continuous supervision and
control over business behavior.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that the Court in the
Socony-Vacuum case especially emphasized that it was solely for Congress to decide whether, or to what extent, the Sherman Act should be
relaxed in the case of trade association and other concerted activities of
competitors.
"Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not
particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive," said Justice Douglas. "It has not permitted the age-old
cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to
price-fixing conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses as a legal justification for such schemes
than it has the good intentions of the members of the combination.
If such a shift is to be made, it must be done by Congress. Certainly Congress has not left us with any such choice." 57
This statement reflects a commendable determination to avoid judicial
encroachment on the legislative sphere and seems to represent a shift
in attitude from some of the earlier decisions. It has been explained in
the foregoing pages that the Court's tolerance of market control secured through mergers, so long as predatory tactics are not involved, is
a result of the legal definition of monopoly, and that this in turn is
consistent with the conception of the monopoly problem held by the
framers of the Sherman Act.
The foregoing comments concerning the Socony-Vacuum case serve
not only to describe the present status of the Sherman Act, but also to
. indicate the requirements of a satisfactory policy of industrial control.
In the first place, it is clear that the Sherman Act must be revised in
such a way as to give monopoly a legal meaning in terms of control of
the market rather than in terms of restriction on freedom to compete.
The mere existence of market controls, however, cannot be treated
as necessarily contrary to the public interest and, hence, illegal. It has
been pointed out that there is some degree of monopolistic influence
present in almost all markets, and also that in some instances, and
subject to appropriate controls, the maintenance of monopoly elements
is in the public interest. Hence, the second and extremely difficult
57

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 221-222, 60 S. Ct. 811
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requirement of public policy is the devising of criteria by which to
distinguish between types of market organization and business practices
which protect the interest of consumers and promote the satisfactory
functioning of the economy and those which do not. Not much more
than a beginning has been made in this task, but the professional economic literature dealing with this problem is increasing steadily and
the material collected by the Temporary National Economic Committee should also prove helpful. Finally, provision must be made for the
application of such standards of business behavior as are developed
and for the continuous supervision and control of business conduct.
Such control might be exercised through a Federal Trade Commission
with enlarged powers, through government competition, through programs of subsidy and taxation, or in other ways.fi 8 It is clear, however,
that the courts are not adapted to this task; long ago "regulation by
lawsuit" was discredited in the public utility field. fio
The foregoing suggestions with regard to a program of industrial
control, far reaching as they are, raise a still larger issue. There is a
grave question whether the degree of control implied in the foregoing
suggestions would be administratively practicable and, what is most
important of all, whether it would be consistent with the maintenance
of political democracy. 60 It has been aptly said that a good system of
control must economize coerciQn. 61 Undoubtedly conscientious enforcement of the anti-trust laws could accomplish much more than has hitherto
been accomplished in the way of eliminating monopoly elements, the
continuation and regulation of which is not required in the public interest.
Undoubtedly also, much could and needs to be done in eliminating
monopoly elements of the latter sort by revising our tariff, patent and
incorporation laws. When all available methods of economizing coercion have been utilized, however, there will remain a vast area of
industry in which varying degrees of monopoly will exist, which it is
neither administratively practicable nor economically desirable to eliminate and which must therefore either be taken over by the government
or subjected to some kind of supervision and control in the public
interest.
The problem of industrial control is thus very different and far
sswARE and MEANS, THE MODERN EcoNOMY IN AcTioN, c. 7, pp. 129-161
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59
G. L. WILSON,
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more difficult than it was conceived to be by the framers of the Sherman
Act. In their view, monopoly outside the public utility field was abnormal and exceptional, and the public interest could be adequately
protected by maintaining freedom to compete by means of an anti-trust
law. There is an important place for programs directed toward eliminating monopoly, indeed a larger place than is sometimes recognized,
but there is a far larger place for efforts designed to supervise and
regulate monopoly in the public interest. The problem of industrial
control thus posed cannot be dodged, and upon our success in grappling
with it will depend in large measure the maintenance of political democracy and the improvement of economic welfare in the immediate future.

